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Abstract—Current access control mechanisms of the hospital 
information system can hardly identify the real access intention 
of system users. A relaxed access control increases the risk of 
compromise of patient privacy. To reduce unnecessary access of 
patient information by hospital staff, this paper proposes a 
Knowledge-Constrained Role-Based Access Control (KC-
RBAC) model in which a variety of medical domain knowledge 
is considered in access control. Based on the proposed Purpose 
Tree and knowledge-involved algorithms, the model can 
dynamically define the boundary of access to the patient 
information according to the context, which helps protect 
patient privacy by controlling access. Compared with the Role-
Based Access Control model, KC-RBAC can effectively protect 
patient information according to the results of the experiments.  
 
Index Terms—Privacy, knowledge, access control, 
information systems, hospital 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he hospital information systems, including Hospital 
Information System (HIS) [1], Laboratory Information 
Management System (LIS) [2], Picture Archiving and 
Communication System (PACS) [3], Radiology Information 
System (RIS) [4] and Electronic Medical Record System 
(EMRS) [5], have been adopted in many hospitals to meet the 
needs of different users. Data in these systems which are 
associated with the personal information of the patients are 
crucial resources for the users. For example, physicians can 
carry out diagnosis and treatment for patients according to 
their personal information and medical history; and medical 
researchers can review and study the cases. As a consequence, 
to make the information and data accessible to approporiate 
users is essential for the design of such information systems. 
However, the information in medical and health data in the 
hospital information systems is extremely personal and 
private; therefore access to which should be strictly 
 
 
controlled to protect patient pravicy and avoid information 
leak. Protecting the information in such systems is an 
important issue. To protect patient privacy, from the legal and 
technical levels, many studies [6–7] have been conducted in 
the area of information security. However, the existing access 
control models have not given full consideration on domain 
knowledge such as the hospital processs and clinical 
pathways. Following a preliminary version of this work [8], 
this paper studies the privacy-protection mechanism for 
information systems in the hospital and puts forward a 
Knowledge-Constrained Role-Based Access Control (KC-
RBAC) model, based on the Role-Based Access Control 
(RBAC) model.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
reviews related RBAC work and patient privacy. Section III 
describes our research motivation and the formal model 
description of KC-RBAC, where Knowledge Module (KM) 
and Purpose Tree (PT) are introduced. Section IV gives the 
three algorithms to identify real user purposes, determine user 
permissions, and protect patient information using medical 
knowledge. Experiments have been conducted to verify the 
performance of KC-RBAC model and are discussed in 
Section V. This paper ends with conclusions and perspectives. 
 
II.  RELATED WORK 
A widely adopted model, the RBAC model, is proposed to 
simplify the access management of information systems [9]. 
In RBAC, system users are distinguished by roles according 
to the access policies, which enables the system to assign a 
new system user with the corresponding access rights 
automatically rather than case by case manually. Hung et al. 
[10] propose a privacy-based framework to tackle the need in 
e-Healthcare services to protect health information. The 
access purpose is also considered in the design of access 
control mechanism, which allows privacy officers to specify 
what data should not be used for certain purposes [11]. With 
the use of big data, the knowledge from the large volume of 
medical data can help improve data management with 
security and performance constraints [12]. The personal 
health record system offers new opportunities for 
personalized healthcare management because patients 
normally worry about their personal information being used  
inappropriately [13]. Facing the rapid growth of users and 
information, Hsu et al. [14] propose the role-based access 
control model to deal with authorization in the healthcare 
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systems. To capture domain knowledge in a formal language, 
such as ontology modeling and semantic modeling, to enable 
automatic performance of access control, is necessary [15]. 
Gritzalis et al. [16] conduct a study on risk assessment to 
protect patient privacy in a shared care platform for the 
treatment of patients suffering from beta thalassemia. Røstad 
et al. [17] believe that the main problem facing the busy 
clinicans is to avoid being exposed with both irrelevant and 
relevant information at the same time. Hence, most studies 
focusing on the privacy protection in hospital information 
systems are based on the RBAC. 
Another research mainstream focuses on the improvement 
of application systems using semantic approaches and 
medical domain knowledge [18, 19]. In the personal health 
record and health knowledge sharing system design, Lee et al. 
[20] use the Integral Healthcare Enterprise-Cross Enterprise 
Document Sharing (IHE-XDS) and the W3C Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) to maintain the Personal Health Records 
(PHRs) and collate the useful health Web resources related to 
the personal diseases. Making better use of existing data in 
the electronic health records to identify eligible subjects can 
improve efficiency and quality of medical care [21]. 
Discovering the knowledge from the medical records may 
support medical personnel in making clinical decisions and 
also help improve personalized medicine and care [22]. 
Considering the difficulties of ensuring the security and 
appropriate use of patient health information contained in 
medical records, an explanation-based auditing system 
(EBAS) [23] was proposed to distinguish the clinical or 
operational reasons and present metrics to determine which 
hospital employees are responsible for treating a given 
diagnosis. 
It is also widely argued that, the knowledge in medical 
domains should be seriously considered when using RBAC 
model in HIS. Some knowledge like the relationship between 
different diseases is given in some international coding 
standards, such as ICD-10 (International Classification of 
Diseases 10th edition) and SNOMED CT (Systematized 
Nomenclature of Medicine-Clinical Terms), and other 
biomedical domain ontologies. Beimel et al. [24] present the 
SitBAC knowledge framework to infer new knowledge based 
on the incoming data access request from the realization 
process. For the pervasive healthcare systems, Li et al. [25] 
propose an authorization model that supports specifying and 
enforcing authorizations in a flexible and efficient way to 
conceptualize the data and explicitly express the relationship 
among concepts and instances. Considering that personal 
healthcare applications range over many disciplines, Blobel 
et al. [26] introduce the care paradigms and discuss the 
requirements to meet the business objectives. In order to 
acquire better accuracy and coverage, Gordona et al. [27] 
propose a cost-effective semi-automated method for 
generating a userful knowledge compendium with minimal 
reliance on domain experts. To some extend, these studies are 
to make use of medical domain ontology to improve the 
performance of RBAC. 
A comparison of the main access control models reviewed 
above is given in Table I from the aspects of role, purpose, 
knowledge, confidentiality, integrity, and flexibility. For the 
patient privacy protection in hospital information systems, 
current access control models still need further improvement 
in reducing access rights by combining the medical domain 
knowledge and the existing RBAC model. 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF THE EXISTING ACCESS CONTROL MODELS 
Models RBAC 
[9] 
PE-RBAC 
[10] 
P-RBAC 
[11] 
OBAM 
[26] 
Role YES YES YES YES 
Purpose NO NO YES NO 
Knowledge NO NO NO YES 
Confidentiality NO YES NO NO 
Integrity YES NO NO NO 
Flexibility NO NO NO YES 
 
III.  A KNOWLEDGE-CONSTRAINED ACCESS CONTROL 
MODEL 
A. Motivation and General Idea 
RBAC and its relevant models can restrict access rights 
according to the role of the users, but this is based on their 
specialties. Theoretically, some employees may have rights to 
access all the medical records of the patients even if their jobs 
have no relationship with patient information at that time. 
This brings potential risks of patient privacy disclosure. 
Thusly, to make the users’ access right more accurate, we take 
the medical domain knowledge and context information into 
consideration to formulate a novel knowledge-constrained 
access control model—KC-RBAC. 
Figure 1 gives an example of the traditional RBAC model, 
where Ai (i = 1, 2, 3, …, n) represents the ith independent 
access right. In this case, ROLE 1 possesses several access 
rights which are different from those of ROLE 2. 
ROLE 1
A1 A2 A3 A5
ROLE 2
A1 A3 A4 A5  
 
Fig. 1. Difference of access rights between two different roles in the 
traditional RBAC model 
Following the case of Figure 1, taking knowledge and 
context into consideration, another case is given in Figure 2.  
ROLE 2
A1 A3 A4 A5
ROLE 2
A1 A3 A4 A5
Knowledge&Context
  
a1
Knowledge&Context
a3 a4 a6  a2 a3 a5 a7  
 
Fig. 2. Difference of access rights for the same role when considering 
knowledge and context 
In this case, the access rights (Ai, i=1,2,…, m) of the same 
role (ROLE 2) are redefined as aj (j=1,2,…, n) by introducing 
the knowledge and context factors. It brings a better control 
on accessing data and information. Even for the same role, 
the acquired patient information is different because the 
knowledge has a dynamic effect on those user permissions. 
Moreover, this mechanism has no impact on the origin system 
business logic. The context in Figure 2 is usually associated 
with the real access purposes of system users. In the hospital 
process, user intention is recognized as the original purposes 
that the user intends to do something. It differs from the 
predefined user purposes of visiting the systems. In this paper, 
user intentions are usually obscure and hard to be predicted, 
whereas user purposes are very clear and predefined in the 
design of system. Figure 3 illustrates the application of KC-
RBAC in real life. 
Doctors
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Response with necessary patient 
information
Request to access the patient 
information
Patient 
Information
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the context
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Fig. 3. Illustration of application with KC-RBAC in real life 
The rest of the paper explores the models and algorithms to 
implement our motivation and idea. 
B. Model Description 
Based on the RBAC model, medical domain knowledge 
and user purpose are involved in the new model. 
1) General Model 
KC-RBAC is used to define the mapping relationships 
between roles and permissions by referring to the medical 
knowledge and the PT with the knowledge inferences and 
semantic analysis to obtain more precise control of 
permission. PT serves as a tree hierarchy that describes the 
purpose of the use of the hospital information systems. 
Though the role hierarchy in hospitals is static, permissions 
for a role, as aforementioned, are dynamic and determined by 
the PT of the user. Following the basic structure of the 
traditional RBAC model, our proposed KC-RBAC model is 
shown in Figure 4. 
Users Roles
Sessions
Purposes Opera-tions Objects
Role Hierarchy Purpose Tree
Medical 
Standards
Hospital 
Processes
Clinical 
Pathway
Rules&La
ws
Knowledge
RecognitionAssign Assign
User_Sessions
Role_Sessions
Permissions
Ontology
...
Fig. 4. Knowledge-Constrained Role-Based Access Control Model (KC-
RBAC), which follows RABC model 
Different from the RBAC model, the knowledge module in 
Figure 4 is introduced to identify the real access purposes of 
the users. The access purpose in this paper is a concept that 
represents the real needs of the system users in a hospital. For 
example, if a doctor wants to offer medical advices to his or 
her patients, the system should provide the doctor only the 
necessary access rights to the relevant patient information. 
However, the key to identify what the doctor actually needs 
depends on the KC-RBAC model which analyzes the user 
intention based on the knowledge. The knoweldge relevant to 
the scope of the patient information acquired includes the 
hospital proceses, roles, as well as the domain knowledge in 
the medical field. Thus, the access control model can restrict 
the hospital employees’ access to other information which is 
unnecessary to the process of medical diagnosis and 
treatment. Such an approach will protect patient privacy as 
far as possible.  
2) Knowledge Module 
The Knowledge Module is the key component in KC-
RBAC to determine the access rights of system users to 
protect patient privacy. Those basic knowledge, such as ICD-
10 and SNOMED CT, provides the ability of knowledge 
inference in the KC-RBAC.  
In RBAC, the role hierarchy is preliminary knowledge in 
medical information systems. Many different roles with 
different purposes exist in the hospital because of the different 
processes in the medical departments. Thus, as a key part of 
the knowledge-based system, the role hierarchy is very 
important. The medical institutions normally have many 
employees, so the rights of the role in the system are hard to 
distinguish even by using contexts. To give strict protection 
for patient privacy in information systems in the hospital, the 
permissions of the role hierarchy in Figure 4 should be 
divided into two types, namely, public and private 
permissions. The logic of the knowledge module is shown as 
Figure 5. Figure 5 shows that the key part of the Knowledge 
Module is the knowledge reasoning engine. It provides the 
user with patient information that a user actually needs based 
on the calculation of medical knowledge. Except for the 
aforementioned basic knowledge, the main knowledge 
sources in medical information systems are the knowledge 
contained in the patients medical records corresponding to the 
knowledge bases such as the SNOMED CT; the domain 
query language of which is SNOMED CT Expression 
Constraint Language (SNOMED ECL) to support the search 
for knowledge in massive knowledge. The number of medical 
records in the hospital increases rapidly, and the invisible 
domain knowledge in those records are valuable. Thus the 
medical records are useful to be reused in our proposed model. 
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Fig. 5. The input and output of Knowledge Module in KC-RBAC 
3) Purpose Tree Module 
The Purpose Tree (PT) Moduel is another key compnent 
that illustrates the user purposes of vising the system in tree 
hierarchical structure. In the different processes of the 
hospital, physicians and other hospital staffs may request for 
different information of the patient in HIS, which we call the 
motivation of visiting as visiting purpose. In order to describe 
the visiting purpose, PT is introduced in this model. Table II 
gives a typical PT of HIS. The Level-1 column suggests 
several general purposes that may appear in the HIS. Based 
on this, more specific system access purposes are introduced 
in Level-2 and Level-3. The relationships of these purposes 
can be graphitized in a tree hierarchy with three levels. 
 
 
TABLE II 
THE PURPOSE TREE FOR HIS 
 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
HIS 
PT 
Decision 
Making 
Analysis Development, Judgment 
Planning Strategy 
Management 
Flow Human, Resource 
Quality Service, Feedback 
Statistics Organization 
Monitor Video, Pictures, Report 
Medical Care 
Advise  
Charge Outpatient, Inpatient 
Inspector Physical Examination 
Procedure Check In/Out, Transfer 
Processing Clinical, Care, Healthcare 
System X-rays 
Management Medical Insurance, Case 
Scientific 
Research 
Medical 
Research 
Data Analysis, Data Mining 
Case Studies Internship, Training 
However, the operations of different hospitals vary from 
each other, and additional work is thusly necessary in the 
development of the system. 
4) Model Formulation 
Based on the description of the KC-RBAC model, we give 
specific formal definitions for KC-RBAC in the following. 
 
Definition I (Symbols and Module Relationships in KC-
RBAC):  
z U, R, RH, P, S, PM, I, and K represent users, roles, role 
hierarchy, purposes, sessions, permissions, information, 
and knowledge, respectively 
z U-R, U-S, S-R, R-P, and P-P represent the relationships of 
user–role, user–session, session–role, role–purpose, and 
purpose–permission respectively 
z U–RU × R, U–SU × S, S–R S×R, IK, where × 
means a many-to-many relationship and Iu = {i|i∈ I, 
Owner(i)∈U} 
z RH  R × R, PT P × P, where the role hierarchy is 
defined based on the RBAC model and PT is a tree 
structure that shows the top–down relationship of the 
purposes 
z K = {kd∪kr|kd∈domain ontology, kr∈rules}. K will 
update itself as time passes 
z PM = R − P R × K × P. The number of PM for R is 
restricted by K and P, R × K = {rk|rkK, rk = (r, k, p), rk
∈rules}, R × K × P = {p|{p} PTu, p∈R × K}. PTu = PT 
× U, PTu means the purposes of the current users. 
z Iu (R, K, P, and PM) is the expected output of the model. 
Outside the system, the input of the model is the set of 
purpose (PTu). To sum up, PTu Iu. 
 
The above definition gives the relationship between 
modules in the model. The module of ROLES, SESSIONS, 
and PERMISSIONS still follows the rules from the 
traditional RBAC model. Based on Definition I, the following 
definition gives clearer description on the structure of the 
proposed PT module. 
 
Definition II (PT): 
z P, PT, UI, and OU (purpose, Purpose Tree, user intention, 
and outside user, respectively) 
z Pu = fp(UI, PT) = {p|p∈PT, u is p’s owner}, UI = fu (R, 
OU, and PM). Fp is a function to obtain what purpose they 
want based on the determination of UI and PT. fu is a 
function to help inference for user intentions.  
z Pu is the result of the total calculation of PT for user u. 
 
Definition III (Knowledge Ontology):  
z AT, DE, RE, and P (attributes, description, relationship, 
and purpose, respectively) 
z K = (AT, DE, RE, and P), P∈PT is the last part of P, 
which is the key part to associate knowledge and purpose 
in this paper. The other parts are traditional relationship of 
domain ontology.  
z Ku = KR∩KPM∩KP, KR is a set of knowledge constrained 
by ROLES, KPM is a set of knowledge constrained by 
permission, and Kp is all knowledge with purpose p. 
 
In Definition II, UI indicates the set of purposes such as 
hospital employees. OU represents those people who want to 
protect their privacy as much as possible (such as the patients). 
Here, we define a function fp as 
}),(|{),( eiupdiffpPTUIf p !  
p, ui∈PT,UI, 0≤e≤1 
(1) 
¯
®
­ #  yx
yxyxsimeyxdiff
≠0
),(
),(  (2) 
In Equation (1), the result of fp is defined as a set in which 
the elements are determined by function diff(p, iu) as in 
Equation (2). The function diff aims to calculate the similarity 
between user purpose and user intention. The function sim（x, 
y） calculates the similarity between x and y. All the results 
of the calculation of function diff should be treated as a set of 
purposes that the users will own. The UI can be calculated by 
},|{ PMRuiOUuiuiUI         (3) 
Thusly, according to the Definition II, the purpose set of 
specific users can be calculated. As aforementioned, the 
ontology of medical domain knowledge, such as SNOMED 
CT, can help the system find the most knowledgeable 
relationships in patient information for better privacy 
protection in Definition III.  
 
IV.  ALGORITHMS AND EXPERIMENTATION 
The formal model description above outlines the basic 
components of KC-RBAC and their relationships. Three 
methods in the KC-RBAC are proposed: Purpose 
Identification Algorithm (PRA), Permission Determination 
Algorithm (PDA), and Knowledge-involved Information 
Filtration Algorithm (KIFA). 
A. Purpose Identification Algorithm (PRA) 
PRA is an algorithm to identify the actual purposes of 
visiting the hospital information systems based on the 
intentions before using the systems. Algorithm I gives the 
step-by-step description. 
 
Algorithm I PRA 
Input: Purpose Tree PT, User Intention UI 
Output: a subset of PT determined by input UI 
1) Let p1, p2, ..., pn as input purposes from user's intention (UI) 
2) Let r as the list result of <purpose, knowledge> that users have 
3) Let pt as the subset of Purpose Tree that shows the relationship 
of purposes the users have 
4) Let Kp as the knowledge (concepts or relationships) of the 
specific purpose of PT 
5) for each pi in UI where i=1,2,..., n do 
6)  if(PT.hasNode(pi) and K(pi)∈Kp ) 
7)   r.push(pi,kp(pi));  
8) for each ai in r where i=1,2,3...,n-1 do 
9)  for each bj in r where j=1,2,3...,n do 
10)   if((ai not equals bj) and (diff(ai, bj) < e)){ 
11)    if(ai.isParent(bj))  
12)     pt.push(ai→bj); 
13)    else 
14)     pt.push(bj→ai); 
15)   } 
16) return pt; 
 
To evaluate the performance of Algorithm I, it is necessary 
to compare the difference between a set of predicted purposes 
and a set of original purposes by assigning weights to the 
purposes and knowledge. The weight of a purpose is an 
integer, ranging from 1 to 10. A larger value means a more 
important purpose. The difference can be calculated by 
Equition (2). Additionally, the aggregate weight of UI (user 
intentions) and UP (recognized purposes) can be calculated 
as 
¦ ¦
 
 
i kUp KkPTp
kpi WbWaW
,
    (4) 
¦¦ ¦
 
 
kp
r
Up KkPTp
kpp WcWbWaW
i k ,,
-      (5) 
where Wi stands for the weight of UI, Wp stands for the weight 
of the user intention, and Wk means the weight of knowledge 
associated with the purpose p. The constant a and b are set as 
0.2 and 0.8 respectively. In Equation (5), Wp stands for the 
weight value of UP, and Wk stands for the knowledge 
associated with purpose p. If there is a strong relationship 
between Wk and p, Wr, as a coordinator, is able to enhance its 
effect in the expecting results. The constant c is set as 0.2. 
Thusly, a weighted PT is built to quantify the model.  
B. Permission Determination Algorithm (PDA) 
Algorithm I returns a subset of the PT, which represents the 
actual purposes of a system user. Given that the system 
modules in the hospital are associated with specific access 
rights for a role, the following algorithm (Algorithm II) is 
presented to summarize all the permissions based on their 
actual purposes determined by Algorithm I.  
 
Algorithm II PDA 
Input: List<Purpose> P, Role R, PurposeTree PT, List<Permission> 
PM 
Output: List<Permission> 
1) Let p1, p2, ..., pn as the Purpose Tree calculated by 
FindCurrentUserPurpose() in Algorithm I 
2) Let Uc as the current user in HIS 
3) Let r1, r2,..., rn as elements of Role R 
4) Let PT as Total Purpose Tree 
5) Let pm1, pm2,..., pmn as elements of List<Permission> 
6) Let upm1, upm2,..,upmn as elements of List<Permission> that r 
has 
7) Let PMr as List<Permission> that user have 
8) for each pmi in PM where i=1,2,...,n do 
9)  if(pmi∈ump and (r isRoleOf Uc)){ 
10)   for each pj in P where j=1,2,...,n do 
11)    if(pj → PMi){ 
12)     PMr.push(pmi); 
13)    } 
14)  } 
15) return PMr 
 
Algorithm II enables the KC-RBAC model to cluster those 
access rights based on the result of Algorithm I because the 
subset of PT may contain the duplicate access rights 
generated in Algorithm I.  
C. Knowledge-Involved Information Filtration Algorithm 
The outputs of Algorithm I consist of the purposes and their 
associate medical standard knowledge including ICD-10 and 
SNOMED CT, which contains massive medical concepts and 
relationships. Moreover, the purposes are associated with 
specific permissions (access rights) in Algorithm II. To 
integrate their relationships, Algorithm III, also called 
Knowledge-Involved Information Filtration Algorithm 
(KIFA), is presented below.  
 
Algorithm III KIFA 
Input: List<Purpose> P, Knowledge K, Roles R, Permission PM, 
Information I 
Output: Iu as user information 
1) Let k1, k2, k3..., kn as elements of Knowledge in libraries (K) 
2) Let r1, r2, r3..., rn as elements of Knowledge that matches 
the purposes (Ki) 
3) Let i1, i2, ...,in as elements of necessary information(i) 
4) Let I1, I2, ..., in as elements of total information(I) 
5) for each ki where i=1, 2,..., n in K do  
6)  for each pj where j=1, 2,..., n in P do 
7)   if(ki.attribute(P) EQ pj){ 
8)    if(pj∈(R∪PM)){ 
9)     r.push(ki) 
10)   } 
11)  } 
12)  for each ii where i=0, 1, 2..., n do 
13)   for each kj where j=01,2... n do 
14)    if(Ii hasknowledge(kj)){ 
15)     i.push(Ii); 
16)    } 
return i; 
 
By using medical domain knowledge-driven libraries, 
based on the actual purposes of requesting of information, the 
KC-RBAC model can finally extract the necessary data from 
the system when hospital employees request patient 
information. 
 
V.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Based on the proposed model and algorithms, this section 
summarizes the results of our experiments. More importantly, 
we report how the model works in the existing hospital 
information systems in real cases. 
A. Case Studies of KC-RBAC in the Hospital 
To evaluate the performance of KC-RBAC, we established 
a prototype hospital information system with real medical 
records of cancer patients (8,654 copies of records) to 
simulate the real process of querying the patient information 
in a hospital. These data contain four kinds of illness 
information, including esophageal cancer, stomach cancer, 
kidney cancer, bowel cancer, and leukemia (2,033 records). 
Each record contains 27 data fields, 11 of which are patient 
privacy data fields. 
Patient personal data, such as the names, identification 
numbers, addresses, and so on, are very sensitive for both 
patients and medical employees. The proposed PT, KM, and 
RH are introduced independently in this system. Two test 
indicators are used to evaluate the results of the experiments, 
including the number of medical records accessed (MRA) 
and the amount of medical knowledge (MK) as shown in 
Table III. In this simulation, we assume that each medical 
record is a 1*n matrix, each cell in the matrix can be seen as 
the basic unit of patient information. At the same time, each 
cell can be mapped to a set of medical domain knowledge. 
Thusly, the MRA is measured based on the number of medical 
records multiplied by the filtering ratio of the purpose, 
knowledge, role and knowledge-role. And the MK is 
measured based on corresponding MRA multiplied by the 
number of concepts and rules of domain knowedge in each 
cell. These relationships and equations are listed in Table III. 
A series of access control models are separately implemented 
upon the system to examine patient privacy protection 
performance of the different models. In order to illustrate how 
the model can protect patient privacy, two cases are given to 
discuss and evaluate the advantages of KC-RBAC. 
TABLE III 
THE FORMAL EQUATIONS TO CALCULATE MRA AND MK OF 
THE DIFFERENT MODELS IN THE EXPERIMENTS  
Models Components MRA MK 
Open-AC - N (all records) MRA*1 
RBAC Role  N * r(%) MRA*K0 
P-RBAC Purpose N *r(%)*p(%) MRA*Kp 
K-RBAC Knowledge N*r(%)*k(%) MRA*Kr 
KC-RBAC Role, 
Purpose, 
Knowledge 
N*r(%)*k(%)*p(%) MRA*(K0+Kp+Kr) 
(N, number of medical records in the system; r(%), percentage of the role-
based records; p(%), percentage of the purpose-based records; k(%), 
percentage of the knowledge-based records; K0, Kp, and Kr, the purpose-, 
role-, and context-lead knowledge) 
Case 1: The matron (head nurse) specifies that a nurse is 
responsible for a patient, and the KC-RBAC-based system 
can automatically filter and provide information about the 
care but doesn’t disclose unnecessary information of the 
patient.  
In Case 1, the nurses follow hospital policies to take care 
of patients, which means that they do not have to know all of 
the patient information. The KC-RBAC model in this case 
firstly determined the preliminary permission of the nurses 
based on their roles and context of hospital policies and 
associated the nurses to their patients. Thusly, the nurses 
know only the necessary patient information. Role, context of 
policies, and permissions are considered to protect patient 
privacy in the nursing process. When applying KC-RABC 
model in the context of Case 1, Algorithm I can filter out the 
unreasonable user intentions and only give necessary access 
rights to user according to the using context. Figure 6 denotes 
the difference of patient information leaks between two 
identification algorithms by using the intention-based and 
purpose-based rules respectively. In the Intention-based 
Identification algorithm, we simulated the process of visting 
HIS without consideration on whether their visiting purposes 
are necessary for the users in some context (e. g. a nurse on 
duty tries to search all records for specific patients in the 
system). In contrast, for the Purpose-based Identification 
algorithm, the user intentions are double checked by 
Algorithm I and mapped to a set of predefined purposes in PT. 
Based on this, in the simulation, we generate a random array 
as the knowledge set, and then assume some mapping 
relationships between the generated knowledge and patient 
information (data cells in the 1*n matrix). Then we run ten 
rounds of comparative experiments. The simulation results 
are shown as Figure 6.  
 
Fig. 6. The results of the comparison between the Intetion-based 
Identification test and the Purpose-based Identification test. 
In Figure 6, the horizontal axis represents the number of 
rounds and the vertical axis represents the estimated values of 
patient information leaks in the simulation. The larger the 
value of vertical axis, the more information or access rights 
the user acquire. The values of the Intention-based 
Identification in vertical axis are higher than those of the 
Purpose-based Identification in each round of experiments. 
This indicates that only the Intention-based Identification is 
hard to reduce the information exposed to system users if no 
further procedures are adopted to identify whether the 
intentions are neccessay.  
Case 2: A doctor wants to do scientific research based on 
the electronic medical records in hospital information 
systems. Given that he/she may have a specific scientific 
research purpose, the KC-RBAC-based system automatically 
filters out all personal information and only displays purpose-
related information.  
In this case, the information that the doctor acquired in 
Case 2 contains not only the related medical records but also 
the knowledge associated with the related medical domains, 
which help the doctors do their research. The medical domain 
is involved in the response of the KC-RABC model to provide 
doctors with more medical reference information. Given that 
the purpose of the doctor is scientific research, the patient 
information will be hidden, reducing the risk of privacy 
leaking. A series of experiments with several different access 
control models were simulated according to Table III. One 
experiment is to compare the difference of the MRA indicator 
in several models when querying the medical records. 
Another one is to compare the difference of the MK indicator 
in different models when querying medical records for 
research. The results of the experiments are shown in Figure 
7.  
 
Fig. 7. Performance evaluation of protecting patient privacy for different 
access models in the prototype system 
In Figure 7, Open-Access Control model (Open-AC), 
RBAC, Purpose-RBAC (P-RBAC), Knowledge-RBAC (K-
RBAC), and KC-RABC are evaluated based on the prototype 
information systems in a hospital. According to the medical 
records accessed by the user (MRA indictor), the Open-AC 
model caused a large risk of privacy disclosure, whereas KC-
RBAC has better performance in comparison with Open-AC, 
RBAC, and K-RABC. The P-RBAC is the model that only 
considers the purpose of using the system, which is not 
suitable for hospital information system because the 
considered purposes could be illegal and irrelevant to the 
hospital process. According to the evaluation of the amount 
of medical knowledge provided by the system (MK indicator) 
in Figure 7, the KC-RBAC provided the best support of 
knowledge-based purposes in Case 2, which shows another 
advantage of the KC-RBAC that is able to improve the 
hospital information systems.  
B. Discussion of the Model’s Application 
The KC-RBAC model is proposed to protect patient 
privacy in the medical information systems of a hospital. The 
existing RBAC models provide the users with a role-based 
access control model with static restrictions. By contrast, the 
proposed KC-RBAC can identify the real purposes of system 
users by referring to the biomedical domain knowledge. 
Different system users in the hospital information systems 
have different roles in a variety of hospital processes. 
However, even for users with the same role in the system, 
their intentions to use the information systems may be 
different and vary in different contexts. As shown in Figure 8, 
in a HIS’s deployed RBAC model, the system user can access 
all information and data authorized to his or her role. While 
in a KC-RBAC system, the accessing rights of a user 
additionally are restricted by using context which is 
supported by knowledge. 
Information/Data in HIS
Access right of User A in 
Context α(KC-RABC)
Access right of User A (RBAC, in all of 
contexts)
Access right of User A in 
Context γ(KC-RABC)
Access right of User A in 
Context β(KC-RBAC)
Fig. 8. The information/data explosed to system user in different contexts 
when adopting KC-RBAC and RBAC. 
The KC-RBAC model should be deployed at the 
fundamental level of the information system of the hospital 
because the patient information is widely existing in different 
sub-systems. All the access requests on patient information 
by hospital employees will be reorganized and modified by 
the KC-RBAC model to protect patient privacy. However, the 
KC-RBAC model is designed for the access control in those 
hospitals with complex processes and organizational structure, 
and as a consequence, it is not suitable for individual doctors.  
The input of Knowledge Module in the KC-RBAC is 
dynamic, while the role hierarchy of RBAC model is static. 
For example, the adopted knowledge includes ICD-10 and 
SNOMED CT, the structure of which supports the expansion 
of medical knowledge in the future without changing our 
model. The user intentions for using the system are associated 
with the purpose hierarchy, and also mapped to the medical 
domain knowledge that includes the semantic maps of 
medical concepts. This flexible knowledge organization 
allows possible knowledge inference to our Knowledge 
Module. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
In a traditional RBAC model, one role is always mapped to 
a fixed set of access rights, which means the user with a 
specific role can access to corresponding modules of the 
systems in any context. This kind of access control 
mechanism lacks flexibility. In this paper, we propose a KC-
RBAC model which has a more precise access control 
according to the user’s context. The identification of visiting 
purpose is realized based on the PT which indicates the 
relationships of purposes in differnet context. Compared with 
current RBAC model and its improvement models, KC-
RBAC can effectively zoom out the scope of data and 
information that a system user can access. The reduction of 
patient information range accessed by the system user 
objectively enhances the privacy protection for patients. 
Based on results of the experiments, the proposed model is 
shown to be highly flexible to protect patient privacy in HIS 
compared with other access control mechanisms. Although 
the model is special for HIS, it also can be used for privacy 
protection in other information systems if corresponding 
context knowledge can be described and encoded in the 
knowledge module. 
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